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CASE NO. 6295

In the Supreme Court of
'The State of Utah
STELLA FELICE GIGLIOTTI,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
LEOPOLDO ALBERGO,
Defendant and Respondent.

J

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh
Judicial District, in and for Carbon County,
State of Utah.
HONORABLE GEORGE CHRISTENSEN, Judge.

Respondent's CBrief
STATEMENT OF CASE
This action was brought by the appellant to quiet title
to certain real property in Carbon County. It is important
at the outset to note the allegation in plaintiff's complaint
as to the ti tie she claimed at the time of bringing the action
and to bear said claim in mind throughout the arguments.
Said allegation of her claim is as follows:
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"2. That the plaintiff is now the holder and
owner in fee simple and in possession and entitled
to the possession of that certain piece or parcel of
real property lying" etc.
This was the allegation that the defendant, respondent herein, was required to defend against.
Appellant states in part on page 1 of her brief, as follows:
"In the main, this court is called upon to determine the rights of a wife of a party defendant
to a foreclosure suit omitted therefrom as a party
defendant and regardless of her deed, had an inchoate interest in the property sought to be foreclosed."
This claim is apparently based on the theory that
because she is and was the wife of Ross Gigliotti she has
an inchoate interest in the property in the nature of or
similar to a dower interest. This is right in the teeth of
her complaint because certainly if she is "the owner in fee
simple" of the property in question she has no such "inchoate interest" in the nature of or similar to a dower interest.
She then comes back in her reply and claims a homestead in the property in question. If the allegations of her
complaint are true that she is "the owner in fee simple"
and that her right is superior and prior to the right of the
respondent then the claim of homestead is immaterial. If
she makes the claim of homestead on the theory that her
husband was the owner of the property and that she as his
wife is entitled to claim a homestead exemption as the head
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of the family she would not be entitled to prevail as the
claim constitutes a variance from her complaint.

In fact

such testimony would disprove the allegations of her complaint that she is "the owner in fee simple" of the property
in dispute and she would therefore lose.
Appellant also states on page 1 of her brief, as follows:
"It is claimed that appellant was in possession
of the real property at the time of the foreclosure
suit and the wife of Ross Gigliotti, who was made a
party to the Albergo suit. It is also claimed that
appellant was the owner of the property by reason
of the unrecorded deed".
This last statement is in conflict with the plaintiff's
testimony which is in part as follows:
"I do not personally claim to be the owner of
this property. I believe Ross is the owner. I am
claiming as Ross' wife." (S. Ab. p. 2)
The plaintiff's attorney likewise stated in open court
that "we are not claiming under any deed." (Tr. p. 38).
The appellant did not include this statement in his abstract
and through an oversight we did not include it in the supplemental abstract, but we believe that the court should consider it anyway, although the statement of appellant herself is conclusive.

A lis pendens was recorded by Albergo of the case of
Albergo v. Gigliotti, et al, --Utah
, 85 P. (2d) 107,
on July 18, 1936, in Book 3-R of Miscellaneous records, page
254, of the records of the county recorder of Carbon County,
Utah.
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On July 29, 1936, a quit-claim deed to the property in
question was recorded wherein Maria Gigliotti and Felice
W. Gigliotti were grantors and Rosario Gigliotti and Stella
Felice Gigliotti, his wife, appellant herein, were grantees.
This deed bears the date July 28, 1936.
After the case of Albergo v. Gigliotti supra had been
appealed to the Supreme Court by the Gigliotti's and the
decision had been adverse to them and on February 18, 1939,
a quit-claim deed was recorded wherein Rosario Gigliotti,
Felice W. Gigliotti and Maria Gigliotti were grantors and
Stella Felice Gigliotti, appellant herein, was grantee. This
deed bears the date July 17, 1936.
It is our contention that this deed is a fraud and that
the idea was conceived only after the Gigliotti's discovered that the deed dated July 28, 1936, and recorded July
29, 1936, would of necessity, have been delivered after the
recording of the lis pendens above described. If this deed
had been in existence on July 28, 1936, or on July 17, 1936,
the deed dated July 28, 1936, would never have been executed and delivered. The parties could not have forgotten
the deed dated July 17, 1936, by July 28, 1936, if it had been
executed and delivered and there would have been no object in the execution and delivery of the second deed if the
first one had been in existence.
Quite a complete statement of the other facts in the
case are contained in the Findings of Fact of the court beginning on page 25 of the Abstract of Record. They are
lengthy and instead of again setting them forth here we
refer the court to them there. It would be well if the court
would read them at this point.
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In the paragraph numbered 2 on page 3 of appellant's
brief she states as follo\vs:
"2. On August 31, 1931, Felice W. Gigliotti
and Maria Gigliotti, husband and wife, as vendors
entered into a contract of sale with Rosario or Ross
Gigliotti as purchaser whereby the vendors agreed
to sell and the purchaser agreed to buy for the
consideration therein named the property involved in this controversy and which contract was recorded in the year 1931 in the office of the County
Recorder of Carbon County in Book 30, page 270.
(Exhibit "A")"
This statement is incorrect as said contract of sale describes only a portion of the property involved in this controversy.
A substantial part of the consideration for said contract of sale was that Ross Gigliotti, the buyer and the husband of appellant", assume, be liable for and pay for the
Albergo mortgage. By doing so he became legally bound
to pay the taxes levied and assessed against said property
as shown by the first case. It held that the Gigliotti's, and
Ross in particular, could not defeat Albergo's mortgage by
allowing the property to be sold to the county and then by
purchasing it at tax sale, because they, and Ross in particular, were under a duty to pay the taxes. The case does
not hold what the appellant claims for it on pages 2 and 3
of her brief except the duty of Ross to have paid the taxes
might be inferred from appellant's statement.
It seems appropriate at this point to set out some of
the findings of the lower court as to the actions of the
Gigliotti's and the part played by the appellant to cheat and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defraud Albergo of his mortgage indebtedness. A part of
said findings are as follows:
"15. That the said Felice W. Gigliotti, Maria
Gigliotti and Rosario Gigliotti, prior to the 11 day
of July, 1936, and with the knowledge and consent
of the said Stella Felice Gigliotti, all repudiated
and abandoned said 'Release and Contract of Sale'
and released one another from liability under it;
that at the time of the repudiation and abandonment of said Release and Contract of Sale by the
parties thereto, which was with the consent of the
said Stella Felice Gigliotti, the mortgage indebtedness to Leopoldo Albergo had not been paid, which
payment of said mortgage indebtedness was the
main part of the consideration for said Release
and Contract of Sale; that said repudiation and
abandonment of said Release and Contract of Sale
and the releasing of the parties obligated thereunder by each other was done in furtherance of the
design to cheat and defraud the said Leopoldo
Albergo of his mortgage indebtedness. That the
said Felice W. Gigliotti, Maria Gigliotti and Rosario
Gigliotti claimed to be the owners of said property
under a new title initiated by the said quit-claim
deed above described from Carbon County to the
said Felice W. Gigliotti, Maria Gigliotti and Rosario Gigliotti; that the said Felice W. Gigliotti,
Maria Gigliotti and Rosario Gigliotti, with the
knowledge and consent of the said Stella Felice
Gigliotti, contended and claimed that said real
property because of said quit-claim deed from Carbon County to them was free and clear of any lien
of the mortgage to the said Leopoldo Albergo."
(Abs. p. 33 & 34)
The "Release and Contract of Sale" mentioned is the
same document as that described in the paragraph numbered 2 on page 3 of appellant's brief.
"16.

That immediately upon the bringing of
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the said foreclosure action by the said Leopoldo
Albergo as hereinabove stated the said Rosario
Gigliotti and his wife, Stella Felice Gigliotti, consulted with their attorney, Harry W. Gustin, as to
the defense of said action; that the said Stella
Felice Gigliotti thereafter, and with her husband
and in furtherance of his design and his parents
design, to cheat and defraud the said Leopoldo
Albergo, conferred with said attorney to defend
said foreclosure action so commenced as above
stated." (Abs. p. 34)
"18. That the said Rosario Gigliotti defended
said foreclosure action and claimed to be the sole
owner of said property because of said quit-claim
deed from Carbon County to himself and his parents dated July 11, 1936; that at said trial and in
his pleadings he made no claim to any title or interest in and to said property because of said Release and Contract of Sale and claimed solely because of the deeds hereinabove set forth; that said
Rosario Gigliotti made said claims, representations,
and defended said action in said manner with the
full knowledge and consent of the said Stella
Felice Gigliotti." (Abs. p. 35)
"24. That on the 7th day of February, 1939,
the court in said Case No. 4553 made and entered
its order of sale directing and requiring the Sheriff
of Carbon County to sell said real property described in paragraph 1 above at public auction; that
notice of sale was duly given by the Sheriff of Carbon County in all particulars as provided by law
that said property would 'be sold at sheriff's sale
on the 4th day of March, 1939, at 10 o'clock a. m.,
on the steps of the Carbon County Court House, at
Price, Carbon County, Utah'; that the said Stella
Felice Gigliotti knew of said sale and that said
sale of said property was to be free and clear of all
encumbrances, claims and rights, of every name
and nature, including any encumbrances, claims or
rights that she had or claims to have in and to said
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property; that said property at said time of saie
was duly and regularly sold to Leopoldo Albergo;
that said property so sold was never redeemed and
after the redemption period had expired sheriff's
deed was duly made, executed and delivered to the
said Leopoldo Albergo conveying to him all of the
property described in paragraph 1 above." (Abs.
p. 37 & 38)
"25. That the said Stella Felice Gigliotti knew
at all times during the pendency of c·ase No. 4553,
and thereafter, that the said Rosario Gigliotti
claimed to be the owner of said real property under
and by virtue of a new title initiated from Carbon
County and not under said 'Release and Contract
of Sale'; that she, at no time from the time of the
commencement of said Case No. 4553 until after
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah had de-·
cided against her husband, made any claim of any
kind or nature in and to said real property or any
part thereof but on the contrary assisted her said
. husband in his attempt to cheat and defraud the
said Leopoldo Albergo as above described; that
prior to the sheriff's sale up to September, 1939,
the said Stella Felice Gigliotti made no claim of
any kind or nature in and to said property except
by the recording of the quit-claim deed claimed to
be dated July 17, 1936, and which was recorded on
February 18, 1939, in Book 3-T of Miscellaneous,
page 353, of the records of Carbon County, Utah.
(Abs. p. 38 & 39)
"26. That the said Stella Felice Gigliotti now
makes no claim in and to said real property in
question because of any deed hereinabove described, as testified to by her in said case, and claims
only 'as the wife' of the said Rosario Gigliotti."
(Abs. p. 39)
The respondent herein contends in part as follows:
1. That appellant, or Ross Gigliotti, acquired no rights
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superior to respondent's by the two quit-claim deeds above
mentioned because both of said quit-claim deeds were re ..
corded after the recording of the lis pendens in the foreclosure case. Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, Sec. 104-55-3.
2. That Albergo is not charged with notice of any alleged "fee simple title" in appellant by reason of the fact
that she was living on the premises with her husband, Ross
Gigliotti, Albergo having the right to assume that she was
on the premises merely by reason of the martial relationship.
3. That appellant and her attorney are bound by their
representations in open court to the effect that they "are
not claiming under any deed" and that they cannot and
could not thereafter, and after cross examination, change
their theory of the case and make a claim under a deed.

That because of the fact that Felice W. Gigliotti,
Maria Gigliotti and Rosario Gigliotti, prior to the 11th day
of July, 1936, and with the knowledge and consent of the
said Stella Felice Gigliotti all repudiated and abandoned
said "Release and Contract of Sale" and released one another from liability under it the appellant has no "inchoate
interest" in said property and cannot impress it with a
homestead claim because of said "Release and Contract of
Sale."
4.

5. It is the settled law of this state that a wife has no
"inchoate interest" in lands held by her husband under an
uncompleted executory contract of sale.
6.

That appellant cannot prevail on the theory that she
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is entitled to claim the property in question as a homestead
under said "Release and Contract of Sale" because said
"Release and Contract of Sale" describes only part of said
property and because in her complaint she alleges that she
is the owner of the fee simple title.
7. That appellant cannot prevail under the tax deed
from Carbon County to her husband and his parents, be.cause said deed was declared void as far as initiating any
new title is concerned, amounting only to a payment of
taxes, and the appellant claims a fee simple title, but she
was not a grantee in said deed.
8. That appellant is estopped to claim a homestead
in the property in question as alleged in her reply or to
claim a fee simple title because she knowingly cooperated
with and assisted her husband in his attempt to defraud
Albergo of his mortgage lien, and knew as found by the
lower court :
"18. That the said Rosario Gigliotti defended said foreclosure action and claimed to be the
sole owner of said property because of said quitclaim deed from Carbon County to himself and his
parents dated July 11, 1936; that at said trial and
in his pleadings he made no claim to any title or
interest in and to said property because of said Release and Contract of Sale and claimed solely because of the deeds hereinabove set forth; that said
Rosario Gigliotti made said claims, representations,
and defended said action in said manner with the
full knowledge and consent of the said Stella Felice
Gigliotti." (Abs. p. 35)
9. That after so cooperating with and assisting her
husband in his attempt to defraud Albergo and knowing
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the representations he had made as to his title she sat idlely
by until after sheriff's sale without asserting her alleged
title and is thereby estopped from making any claim to said
property.
10. That as this is an equity case and the appellant
is not in court with clean hands the court will not aid her
in her claim.
11. That the court likewise will not aid her in perpetrating a fraud.

ARGUMENT
The appellant on page 8 of her brief states that "Any
interest in property and even possession alone is sufficient
to maintain" a quiet title action and cites three cases in
support of said contention.
These cases do not hold what the plaintiff states that
they do, as a reading of them will readily show. The matter, however, is not important as the plaintiff has alleged
in her complaint that she is the owner of a fee simple title.
She is bound by that.
We have read all of the authorities cited by appellant
in her brief but none of them apply or are in point in the
case at bar.
We do not have access to the case of Fahie v. Pressey,
2 Ore. 23, 80 Am. Dec. 401, cited on page 10 of appellant's
brief but a reading of what appellant says concerning said
case shows that it has no application here. So far as the
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statement of facts show, the property was in the name of
the wife and that fact must have been of record or there
was something that advised the mortgagee of that fact. He
foreclosed only against the husband. We note that she has
quoted the following portion from said brief:
"To entitle a party to relief in such cases, the
facts must not only be material, but must be such
that he could not with reasonable diligence have
obtained knowledge of them. Where there is neither accident nor mistake, fraud nor misrepresentation, equity affords no relief to a party on the
ground that he has lost his remedy at law through
mere ignorance of a fact, the knowledge of which
might have been obtained with due diligence."
There is no way that Albergo through due diligence
could have ascertained that appellant herein was the holder
of an unrecorded deed. The purpose of our recording statutes is to require persons who hold deeds to property to
have them recorded or lose when intervening rights arise.
There was no lack of diligence on Albergo's part in this case.
We also claim as will be hereinafter argued that appellant
in this case assisted her husband in misrepresenting the
true state of facts in an attempt to perpetrate a fraud upon
Albergo.
We have also read the case of Bank of United States v.
Lee, 13 Pet. 107. This case has absolutely no application to
the case at bar. The facts involved and the decision are
as follows:
"R. B. L. in 1809, then residing in Virginia, for
a valuable consideration, made a conveyance in
trust for the benefit of his wife, of certain personal
property and slaves, which deed was duly recorded
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according to the provisions of the act of the Legislature of Virginia. The property thus conveyed,
remained in the possession of the husband and wife
while they resided in Virginia; and in 1814, R. B. L.
removed to the District of Columbia, with his wife
and family, and brought with him the slaves and
property conveyed in trust for his wife. In 1817,
R. B. L. borrowed a sum of money of the Bank of
the United States, on his promissory note, indorsed
by one of the trustees named in the deed of trust of
1809. At the time the loan was made, R. B. L. executed a deed of trust of eleven slaves, and among
them were the slaves and the household furniture
conveyed by the deed of 1809, to secure the bank
for the amount of the loan. In 1827, R. B. L. died,
entirely insolvent. During his residence in Washington, being in reduced circumstances, he sold
some of the slaves, conveyed by the deed of 1809,
for the support of his family; without objection by
his wife or her trustees. In 1834, the debt to the
bank being unpaid, a bill was filed aginst Mrs. E. L.,
the wife of R. B. L., and the trustees in order to
compel the surrender of the remaining slaves and
the household furniture, to the trustee for the
bank, for the sale of the same, to satisfy the debt
due to the bank. Held, that the deed of 1809, vesting the property in Mrs. L.'s trustees, was effectual, according to the laws of Virginia, to protect
the title thereto, against the ·subsequent creditors,
or purchasers from R. B. Lee; and that the removal
of R. B. L. and his wife into the District of Columbia with the property conveyed to the trustees
for the use of Mrs. L., did not affect or impair the
validity of the deed of trust.
"A liberal construction should be given to the
clause of the Virginia statute for the suppression of
fraud. This is the well established rule in the construction of the statute of Elizabeth, which the
first section of the Virginia statute substantially
adopts.
"If A sells, or conveys his lands or slaves to B,
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and then produces to another his previous paper
title, and obtains credit on the goods or lands, by
pledging them for money loaned, he is guilty of
fraud; and if the true owner stands by, and does
not make his title known, he will be bound to make
good the contract, on the principle that he who
holds his peace when he ought to have spoken, shall
not be heard now that he should be silent. He is
deemed, in equity, a party to the fraud."
Sloane v. Lucas, et at, 79 P. 949, (Wash)
There is no question involved in this case as to
the knowledge of the mortgagee as to the title of
the land. The purchaser had a deed and was,
therefore, seised of the property, and of course, his
wife should have been made a party defendant.
In the case at bar Ross Gigliotti, the husband of the
appellant herein, did not have any deed which showed of
record and of which Albergo had knowledge, and the appellant herself had no deed which appeared of record and of
which the defendant Albergo had knowledge. Ross Gigliotti
had been purchasing a part of the property in question under
a contract of sale but he and the sellers, his parents, had
abandoned and ·released one another from said contract,
with the knowledge and consent of the appellant as will be
more fully discussed hereinafter.
Northwestern Trust Co. v. Ryan, 132 N. W. 202,
(Minn):
This case is likewise one in which the title was
conveyed to the husband before the foreclosure proceedings were commenced. The mortgage made
the husband a party defendant in the case but
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failed to include the wife. It is obvious that this
case has no application.
Kursheedt, et al., v. Union Dime Savings Inst., 23
N. E. 473, (New York):
The portion of the case quoted by the appellant
states that the "right" of dower "attaches on the
land when the seisin and the marriage relation are
concurrent."
Ross Gigliotti never became seised of the property in
question or any part of it prior to the recording of the lis
pendens. Appellant is likewise foreclosed from making a
claim of inchoate interest in the property because in her
complaint she alleges she is the owner of a fee simple title,
which is something entirely different from an inchoate interest in real property, the title of which is in her husband
and not in herself.
Carlquist v. Coltharp, 248, P. 481, (Utah):
This case does not involve the rights of a married woman. In fact the court speaks of Louise
Jensen as Miss Louise Jensen. :She had been deeded part of the property in question and her deed
had been properly recorded prior to the bringing
of the foreclosure action. The case has absolutely
no application to the case at bar in any particular.
Boucofski v. Jacobson, 36 U. 165, 104 P. 117,
and
Halloway v. Wetzel, 86 U. 387, 45 P. (2d) 565:
We are at a loss to see how appellant claims
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these cases apply.
Appellant did not record any deed to her until February
18, 1939. If she had taken and kept possession of the
property Albergo would have been required within the limitation period to bring an action against her for possession
or be barred. The note and mortgage were not barred and no
attempt is being made here to require her to pay them.
Appellant has failed to point out in her brief which section
of the statute of limitations applies and why it does so. We
are certain that it has no application whatsoever.
On page 19 of appellant's brief she has quoted the following:

42 C. J.,-Mortgages-Section 1567 P. 50:
"If the mortgagor, after the execution of the
mortgage, makes a conveyance of the mortgaged
property, and the conveyance is not recorded before
foreclosure proceedings are commenced, and the
mortgagee is not notified of the grantee's interest,
by his being in possession or otherwise, such
grantee need not be made a defendant, and a judgment against the mortgagor is conclusive against
him."
This is a correct statement of law as we understand it and it completely answers against the
plaintiff any claim as to the validity of her unrecorded deed giving her a title superior to Albergo's.
He was not ·notified as to her interest in the
property and we will hereinafter discuss appellant's
contention that the fact that she was on the property was sufficient to put him on notice.
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We will now present our contentions concerning the
case in order :

I.
THAT APPELLANT, OR ROSS GIGLIOTTI,
ACQUIRED NO RIGHTS SUPERIOR TO RESPONDENT'S BY THE TWO QUIT-C.LAIM
DEEDS ABOVE MENTIONED BECAUSE BO·TH
OF SAID QUIT-CLAIM DEEDS WERE RECORDED AFTER THE RECORDING OF THE LIS
PENDENS IN THE FORE·CLOSURE CASE.
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Section 104-55-3,
provides as follows:

"No person holding a conveyance from or under the mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or
having a lien thereon, which conveyance or lien
does not appear of record in the proper office at
the time of the commencement of the action, need
be made a party to such action, and the judgment therein rendered, and the proceedings therein
had, are as conclusive against the party holding
such unrecorded conveyance or lien as if he had
been made a party to the action."
At the time the lis pendens in the foreclosure action
was recorded the property was shown in the name of Felice
W. Gigliotti and Maria Gigliotti his wife. Said lis pendens
was recorded on July 18, 1936. On July 29, 1936, a quitclaim deed dated July 28, 1936, was recorded wherein Felice
W. Gigliotti and Maria Gigliotti quit-claimed the property
in question to Ross Gigliotti and Stella Felice Gigliotti his
wife, appellant herein. On February 18, 1939, a quit-claim
deed was recorded wherein Rosario Gigliotti, Felice W.
Gigliotti and Maria Gigliotti, quit-claimed the property in
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question to Stella Felice Gigliotti. This deed is claimed to
be dated July 17, 1936. These are the oniy deeds to appellant in this case and the only source of any "fee simple
title" in her. Because of the statute above quoted she cannot prevail in this case under either of said deeds.

II.
THAT ALBE.RGO IS NOT CHARGED WITH
NOTICE OF ANY ALLEGED "FEE SIMPLE
TITLE" IN APPELLANT BY REASON OF THE
FACT THAT SHE WAS LIVING ON THE PREMISES WITH HER HUSBAND, ROSS GIGLIOTTI,
ALBER.GO HAVING THE RIGHT TO ASSUME
THAT SHE WAS ON THE PREMISES MERELY
BY REASON OF THE MARTIAL RELATIONSHIP.
Tiffany on Real Property - ( 2d) Edition, Vol. 2,
S.ection 571, at page 2233:
"That the property is occupied by a married
couple would not ordinarily put a purchaser from
the husband on inquiry as to the adverse interest
in the wife, he having the right to assume that she
is on the premises merely by reason of the martial
relationship."
Langley v. Pulliam, et al., 162 Ala. 142, 50 So. 365:
"Where a husband conveyed a lot to his wife
by deed, which was not recorded, and there was no
change of possession, even if the husband and wife,
who lived together, afterwards lived on the lot conveyed, it would not afford notice of the wife's
rights as against those claiming as bona fide purchasers through the husband.
"Where a husband conveyed a lot to his wife
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and executed a mortgage on it, which was assigned
before the deed was filed for record, and the lot
was purchased at foreclosure after the recording of
the deed the purchaser would have been exempt
from the effect of notice to the mortgagee of the
existence of the wife's title before the mortgage
was executed if there had been proof of a consideration paid for the mortgage."
Storz v. Clarke, 221 N. W. 101, 117 Neb. 488:
"Joint occupancy of premises as family home
did not impart notice of wife's claim of any interest other than homestead right."
III.
THAT APPELLANT AND HER ATTO·RNEY
ARE BOUND BY THEIR REPRESENTATIONS
IN OPEN COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY
"ARE NOT CLAIMING UNDER ANY DEED"
AND THAT THEY CANNOT AND COULD NOT
THEREAFTER, AND AFTER CROSS EXAMINATION, CHANGE THEIR THEORY OF THE CASE
AND MAKE A CLAIM UNDER A DEED.

The appellant was the first witness that was called· to
testify in the case. She and her attorney had apparently
changed their minds since the filing of the complaint as to
what she should claim as her source of title. She stated in
part, as follows:
"I do not personally claim to be the owner of
this property. I believe Ross is the owner. I
am claiming as Ross's wife." (S. Ab. p. 2)
The plaintiff's attorney stated in open court, as follows:
"We are not claiming under any deed."
p. 38).

(Tr.
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So far as the record showed the only deed to Ross was
the one from his parents to him and the appellant herein.
She was a grantee in it with him. The deed, however, was
recorded after the lis pendens, and, of course, would give her
no rights. It appeared that the only claim that she could
be making would be under the "Release and Contract of
Sale" above described.
We cross examined her on the deed that she had caused
to be recorded on February 18, 1939, wherein she was the
grantee. This was done to show that at that time she
was making no claim under said Release and Contract of
Sale and as some proof of our contention that said Release
and Contract of ;Sale had been abandoned by the parties
to it, with appellant's knowledge and consent. If said
deed was actually executed and delivered on July 17, 1936,
the day before the foreclosure action was started, it shows
conclusively as far as appellant is concerned that prior to
the commencement of the foreclosure she was claiming a
fee simple title herself and not any right under said Release and Contract of Sale, and bears out our contention that
said Release and Contract of Sale had been completely
abandoned by the parties to it with her knowledge and consent.
The deed was introduced to explain the conversation
and to show that Mrs. Gigliotti was not making any claim
under said Release and Contract of Sale.
After said quit-claim deed had been introduced and received into evidence, the appallant was permitted, over
Albergo's objections, to amend her reply by addition of the
following thereto:
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"That on or about the 17 day of July, 1936
Rosario Gigliotti and Felice Gigliotti and Maria
Gigliotti conveyed the property in question, by
quit-claim deed, to the plaintiff, Stella Felice
Gigliotti, as shown by the Defendant's Exhibit
No. 1 heretofore offered and received in evidence
in this case."
This was certainly improper after her statement that
she was not claiming under any deed and the statement of
her attorney that they were not claiming under any deed.
We believe, however, that it constituted an abandonment
of any homestead claim as set forth in her reply as the
homestead matter was based on her rights because her
husband was a purchaser under the "Release and Contract
of Sale." She could not and cannot claim under both as
they are entirely inconsistent matters.
IV.
THAT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT
FELICE W. GIGLIOTTI, MARIA GIGLIOTTI
AND ROSS GIGLIOTTI, PRIOR TO THE 11TH
DAY OF JULY, 1936, AND WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE SAID STELLA
FELICE GIGLIOTTI, ALL REPUDIATED AND
ABANDONED SAID "RELEAS:E AND CO,NTRACT OF SALE" AND RELEASED ONE ANOTHER FROM LIABILITY UNDER IT, THE
APPELLANT HAS NO "INCHOATE INTEREST"
IN SAID PROPERTY, AND CANNOT IMPRESS
IT WITH A HOMESTEAD CLAIM BECAUSE OF
SAID "RELEASE AND CONTRAC'T OF ;SALE."
Finding of Fact No. 18 of the Court is, as follows:
"That the said Rosario Gigliotti defended
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said foreclosure action and claimed to be the sole
owner of said property because of said quit-claim
deed from Carbon County to himself and his parents dated July 11, 1936; that at said trial and in
his pleadings he made no claim to any title or interest in and to said property because of said Release and Contract of Sale and claimed solely because of the deeds hereinabove set forth; that said
Rosario Gigliotti made said claims, representations,
and defended said action in said manner with the
full knowledge and consent of the said Stella
Felice Gigliotti."
Ross Gigliotti at the trial of the first case in the beginning of the trial denied the existence of said Release
and Contract of Sale ·and admitted it only after Albergo
had proven it conclusively against him. Ross Gigliotti
claimed that the deed from Carbon County initiated an entirely new source of title and for that reason the lien of
the Albergo mortgage was defeated.
Ross Gigliotti had not performed the terms of said
Release and Contract of Sale .bY paying off the Albergo
mortgage as he agreed to do in said Release and Contract
but in the attempt to defeat the lien of Albergo's mortgage
the property was allowed to go to Carbon County for the
purpose of "initiating a new title". And to strengthen the
matter the parents of Ross Gigliotti gave him and his wife
the quit..-claim deed, which was recorded after the lis pendens. These matters alone show that the "Release and
Contract of Sale" was abandoned by the parties in question
and they all agreed to release one another from liability
under it.
The claim that appellant makes that the quit-claim
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deed to her alone by the other three Gigliotti's, was prior
to the commencement of the foreclosure action, shows that
said Release and Contract of Sale was abandoned with her
knowledge and consent. She was not a party to said Release
and Contract of Sale and it did not provide that title be
conveyed to her. She was assisting her husband in attempting to defraud Albergo and took this deed as an added precaution. He was claiming under the deed from Carbon
County, and with her knowledge and consent. The appellant and her husband, Ross Gigliotti, conferred with
Mr. Gustin from the time the first action was started. Flora
Tolman, witness for appellant, testified that she was employed as a secretary in Mr. Gustin's office and concerning
the deed to Mrs. Gigliotti recorded on February 18, 1939,
and as to Mrs. Gigliotti being in Mr. Gustin's office, as follows:
"The reason why it hadn't been recorded previously is because Mr. Gustin hadn't made up his
mind that it should be recorded or not. I know that
the deed had been there for considerable time before it was recorded and I am sure that it could
have been there as long as w year and it might
have been there two years, but I cannot say positively. I remember Mrs. Gigliotti being in the
office in July after the suit was started. I don't
remember seeing her in the office as far back as
the time whe.n I first saw the deed but she may
have been. I know she was in the office several
times. The suit that I refer to is the foreclosure
suit. She carne to town with Mr. Gigliotti and she
came in the office. (Abs. p. 60 and S. Abs. p. 3).
Mrs. Gigliotti herself testified in part as follows:
"I do not remember the exact date that I delivered the deed to Mr. Gustin but I delivered it
to Mr. Gustin at his office. When I went to Salt
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Lake to see Mr. Gustin, Ross Gigliotti took me in
and he was present during the entire transaction."
(Abs.- p. 56)
..

"I delivered the deed to Mr. Gustin at his
office. I don't remember if it isn't a fact that Ross
Gigliotti delivered it to him." (8. Abs. p. 2).
This testimony shows conclusively that Mrs. Gigliotti
knew what was going on in the first case from the beginning; that she was conspiring with her husband to defeat
the lien of Albergo's mortgage, and that the abandoning of
said Release and Contract of Sale and the releasing of all
parties thereto from liability was done with her knowledge
and consent.
A further fact that said Release and Contract of Sale
had been abandoned and the parties thereto released is, that
said Contract describes only a part of the property in ques..
tion, and Ross Gigliotti in case No. 4553 was claiming all of
the property under the quit-clai!fl deeds from Carbon County
and his parents, and the appellant herein is likewise claiming all of the property and not a part of it.
That a wife can consent that her husband abandon a
contract under which. she might have some rights is too
elementary to require· citation of authorities. All rights
under the Release and Contract of Sale had gone out of existence and been terminated prior to the commencement of
the foreclosure action if appellant's contention is correct,
that a quit-claim deed was made, executed and delivered
to her, prior to the time of the commencement of the fore . .
closure suit. This fact alone precludes her from making
a claim of homestead under said Release and Contract of
Sale.
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Anderson v. Cosman 72 N. W. 523:
"The vendee under a land contract occupied
the land, with his family, as a homestead. Owing
to his inability to make the required payments, he
surrendered the contract to the vendor, who sold
and conveyed the land to a third person, and the
original vendee leased the premises from this
grantee. Held, that by acquiescing in this arrangement, with full knowledge of the facts, the wife
of the original vendee abandoned her homestead
rights in the land."

v.
IT IS THE SETTLED LAW OF THIS STATE
THAT A WIFE HAS NO "INCHOATE INTEREST" IN LANDS HELD BY HER HUSBAND UNDER AN UNCOMPLETED EXECUTORY CONTRACT OF SALE.
66 A. L. R. 67: Annotation.
"In jurisdictions where the husband must be
seized of the legal title, or of such a complete equitable title that it will be deemed an estate of inheritance, to entitle the wife to dower, it is generally
held that a wife has no dower in lands held by the
husband at the time of his death under an uncompleted executory contract of sale."
See UTAH CASE in support of said
statement. McNeil v. McNeil 61 U. 141,
211 P. 988:
VI.
THAT APPELLANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON
THE THEORY THAT SHE IS ENTITLED TO
CLAIM THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION AS A
HOMESTEAD UNDER SAID "RELEASE AND
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LEAS.E AND CONTRACT OF SALE" DESCRIBES
ONLY PART OF SAID PROPERTY AND BECAUSE IN HER COMPLAINT SHE ALLEGES
THAT SHE IS THE OWNER OF THE FEE
SIMPLE TITLE.
The description of the property included in said Release and Contract of Sale, is as follows:
Beginning at a point which is 1226 feet East
of the Northwest corner of Section 13, Township 13
South, Range 9 East of the Salt Lake Meridian,
thence South 157 feet, thence North 79 degrees 10
minutes East a distance of 270 feet more or less to
the County road right-of-way, thence northwesterly along said right-of-way to the North line of
said Section 13, thence West to the place of beginning;
and it is only a portion of the property that is involved in
this action. The said property involved in this action is
described, as follows:
Commencing at a point 74 feet East of the
Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of the
Northwest quarter Section 13 Township 13 South,
Range 9 East of the Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence West 436 feet; thence South 333 feet;
thence North 85 degrees 20 minutes East along line
of fence 455 feet; thence North 3 degrees 20 minutes West 296 feet, to the place of beginning, being
two and three-fifths acres of land in the Northwest
quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 13,
Township 13 South, Range 9 East, Salt Lake Meridian, .and three-fifths acres in the Northeast quarter
of the Northwest quarter of Section 13, together
with and including all improvements thereon and
all rights and appurtenances thereunto belonging
or thereunto in anywise appertaining.
Also, beginning at a point which is 74 feet
East and 46 feet South 3 degrees 20 minutes East
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of the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter

of the Northwest quarter of Section 13, Township
13 South, Range 9 East, Salt Lake Meridian; thence
South 3 degrees 20 minutes East 250 feet; thence
North 86 degrees 50 minutes East 242.2 feet;
thence Northwesterly on a curved line along old
fence to the point of beginning, containing eighttenths of an acre, together with one acre of primary water right and also all improvements thereon and all rights and appurtenances thereunto belonging or thereunto in any wise appertaining; also,
all water rights owned by the mortgagors of whatever nature, kind and description and however
evidenced, used upon the above mentioned and
described parcel of land.
VII.
THAT APPELLANT CANNOT PREVAIL
UNDER THE TAX DEED FROM CARBON
COUNTY TO HER HUSBAND AND HIS PARENTS BECAUSE SAID DE.ED WAS DECLARED
VOID AS FAR AS INITIATING ANY NEW
TITLE IS CONCERNED, AMOUNTING ONLY
TO A PAYMENT OF THE ·TAXES, AND THE
APPELLANT CLAIMS A FEE SIMPLE TITLE,
BUT SHE WAS NOT A GRANTEE IN SAID
DEED.
Apparently, and so far as we know, appellant since the
commencement of this action has not, and does not now,
make a claim because of the tax .deed from Carbon County.
Said deed was declared absolutely void in the other case and
that it amounted merely to a payment of the taxes and a
redemption of the property from tax sale. She also cannot
claim anything under the tax deed because in her complaint she alleges to be the owner of a fee simple title and
in her reply, as amended, she claims to be the owner of
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said fee simple title because of the quit-claim deed to her
personally, which was given to her by the other three
Gigliotti's and which was recorded on February 18, 1939.
VIII.
THAT APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED TO
CLAIM A HOMESTEAD IN THE PRO·PERTY IN
QUESTION AS ALLEGED IN HER REPLY OR
TO CLAIM A FEE SIMPLE TITLE BECAUSE
SHE KNOWINGLY COOPERATED WITH AND
ASSISTED HER HUSBAND IN HIS ATTEMPT
TO DEFRAUD ALBERGO OF HIS MORTGAGE
LIEN, AND KNEW AS FOUND BY THE LOWER
COURT:
"18. That the said Rosario Gigliotti defended
said foreclosure action and claimed to be the sole
owner of said property because of said quit-claim
deed from Carbon County to himself and his parents dated July 11, 1936; that at said trial and in
his pleadings he made no claim to any title or
interest in and to said property because of said
Release and Contract of Sale, and claimed solely
because of the deeds hereinabove set forth; that
said Rosario Gigliotti made said claims, representations, and defended said action in said manner with the full knowledge and consent of the
said Stella Felice Gigliotti." (Abs. p. 35)
The same testimony quoted under No. IV above shows
conclusively that the appellant knowingly cooperated with
and assisted her husband in his attempt to defraud Albergo
of his mortgage lien.
It has been the claim of appellant throughout this case
that it would be necessary for her to have actively done
something before she can be estopped and that she could not
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be estopped by merely sitting idlely by. As the testimony
conclusively shows that she actively cooperated with and
assisted her husband we will not take the time of the court
by citing authorities.

IX.
THAT AFTER SO COOPERATING WITH
AND ASSISTING HER HUSBAND IN HIS ATTEMPT TO DEFRAUD ALBERGO AND KNOWING THE REPRESENTArriONS HE HAD MADE
AS 'fO HIS TITLE SHE SAT IDLELY BY UNTIL
AFTER SHERIFF'S 1SALE WITHOUT ASSER.TING HER ALLEGED TITLE AND IS THEREBY
ESTOPPED FROM MAKING ANY CLAIM TO
SAID PROPERTY.
The testimony quoted above shows conclusively that
Mrs. Gigliotti knew of the foreclosure action and that she
assisted her husband in his defense of it, and of necessity
must have known of the sheriff's sale. It was stipulated in
the case, as follows :
"That prior to the 1st day of September,
1939," - the date of the sheriff's sale - "the
sheriff was not notified by Mrs. Gigliotti or anyone acting for her that she claimed an interest
in the property." (Abs. p. 65)
On the general topic of estoppel to assert homestead,
we refer the court to that topic, which is No. 9, under the
heading of homestead in 26 Am. Jur.
26 Am. Jur. - Hontestead - Section 212:
If a mortgagee can show that a homestead
claimant acted with intention to deceive him he is
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entitled to prevail.
X

THAT AS THIS lS AN EQ·UITY CASE AND
THE APPELLANT IS NOT IN COURT WITH
CLEAN HANDS THE COURT WILL NOT AID
HER IN HER CLAIM.

XI.
THAT Tl-IE COURT LIKEWISE WILL NOT
AID HER IN PERPETRATING A FRAUD.
These
introduced
sisted and
defeat and

two are closely interwoven. All of the evidence
shows conclusively that the appellant herein ascooperated with her husband in an attempt to
defraud Albergo of this mortgage lien.

"HE WHO c·OMES INTO EQUITY MUST
COME WITH CLEAN HANDS."
Hensley v.

Maxwell~

(Okla) 44 P. (2d) 60:

"Homestead exemptions cannot be used as
shield for fraud."
Principles of Equity -

Clark -

Section 30:

"He who comes into equity must come with
clean hands. This maxim is closely related to the
one just preceding in that it is founded upon 'good
conscience;' but it differs from that one in placing
an absolute bar gainst relief instead of requiring
only the giving of a conditional decree. Unlike
the other maxim, too, there is an analogous maxim
in the common law and Roman law, which is usually given in the Latin form: Ex turpi causa
non oritur action; of which the following is a free
translation; 'no cause of action will arise out of an
illegal transaction.' "
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We would now like to discuss one or two other features
of this case. There is much authority to the effect that it
is not necessary to make a married woman a party defendant in a case when she does not have the legal title to the
property unless she could have claimed dower because of
the right of her husband to the property.
Skillen et al v. Harris et al., (Mont) 3 P (2d) 1054:
"Wife whose dower right was not involved in
foreclosure action held proper but not necessary
party."
We must distinguish between a necessary and a proper
party to an action. There is authority to the effect that
Ross Gigliotti was likewise a proper party to the foreclosure
action but not a necessary party.
Bennett v. U. S. Land, Title and Legacy Company,
(Ariz) 141 P. 717:
"A party holding an executory contract to
purchase mortgaged property, executed by the
mortgagor subsequent to the giving and recording
of the mortgage and before a foreclosure is commenced is not a necessary party defendant to foreclosure proceedings."
"In ejectment plaintiff must recover upon the
strength of his own title."
It is elementary law that the appellant in this case to
secure a decree quieting title to the property in her must
prevail upon the strength of her own title. We call to the
court's attention that the appellant offered no testimony
whatever by deed, abstract or otherwise, showing any source
of title in herself or Ross Gigliotti prior to the institution
of the foreclosure action.
Bancroft Code Pleading -

page 3299:
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"The mortgagor represents the interests of
the grantee in the unrecorded conveyance and
when the court acquires jurisdiction of the mortgagor in the action to foreclose it also acquires jurisdiction of all persons who hold unrecorded conveyances or contracts from him so as to conclude
them by the judgment entered in the foreclosure
suit. By standing idlely by and permitting the
action to be prosecuted without intervention upon
his part, such granteee in effect consents to be represented by his grantor and is estopped from asserting his title. against the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, or those in privity with him."
Even if the Release and Contract of Sale had not been
abandoned it is very doubtful if appellant could claim a
homestead so as to defeat Albergo's mortgage.
Section 38-0-1, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933:
Homestead Exemption - Exceptions.

"A homestead consisting of lands, appurtenances and improvements, which lands may be
in one or more localities, not exceeding in value
with the appurtenances and improvements thereon
the sum of $2,000 for the head of the family, and
the further sum of $750 for the spouse, and $300
for each other member of the family, shall be exempt from judgment lien and from execution or
forced sale, except upon the following obligations:
(1) taxes accruing and levied thereon; and (2)
judgments obtained on debts secured by ·lawful
mortgage on the premises and on debts created for
the purchase price thereof."
The largest part of the consideration for the Release
and Contract of Sale was Ross Gigliotti's promise and
agreement to pay the Albergo mortgage, which would clear
the mortgage from the property which he was buying and
(,
the property which his parents were keeping and were not
sel~ing to ·him.
Albergo's judgment of foreclosure was
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therefore obtained on a debt secured by a lawful mortgage
on the premises, and Ross Gigliotti in his contract to purchase likewise assumed and agreed to pay said mortgage
and his indebtedness under it thereby became a debt created
for the purchase price thereof.
The law is clear under that section that Mrs. Gigliotti
cannot claim a homestead to defeat Albergo's mortgage.
Section 217, 29 C. J. 866 :
"Under most homestead provisions if a part of
the consideration for the conveyance of the land
is- the purchaser's agreement to pay a debt of the
vendor to a third person, the latter may enforce
his rights in preference to the homestead claim."
19 R. C. L. Section 334 :
"The wife, where the mortg·age is given for
the purchase money of land sold, is not a necessary
party to a bill to foreclose the mortgage. In such
case, the seizin of the husband passes from him eo
instanti that he acquires it, and being immediately
revested in the grantor, the widow cannot claim
dower in the premises. If then the widow could not
be endowable, the wife, while the husband is living
can have no interest in the premises, and consequently she need not be a party to the foreclosure."
89 A. L. R. 531: Annotation.
"With few exceptions it is held that one in
possession of land under a contract of purchase
has a sufficient equitable interest therein on which
to claim a homestead therein except as against the
unpaid vendor or one claiming through him or
under the purchase money obligation, and it appears that that the question of how much of the
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purchase price remains unpaid, whether all or part,
is not a subject of inquiry in deciding such cases.
See many cases cited and also the Utah
case- Hansen v. Mauss. (1912) 40 U. 361
121 P. 605.
42 c. J. 53:
"As dower is not claimable against a purchasemoney mortgage the wife need not be joined in proceedings to foreclose a mortgage of that kind."
A contention was made at the time of the trial of the
case that Albergo could not claim fraud on the part of Mrs.
Gigliotti to defeat her claim of homestead because the fraud
claim was not pleaded. There is nothing to such a contention because the only claimed source of title pleaded by the
appellant is in her reply and the homestead matter is likewise first pleaded there. They are affirmative matters and
pleadings and all defenses to affirmative matters set forth
in a reply can be presented.
In closing we wish to point out to the court that the
only purpose of the quit-claim deed from the three Gigliotti's
to Stella Felice Gigliotti which was not recorded until February 18, 1939, could only have been for the purpose of
deeding the title to the property out of the mortgagors in
an attempt to defraud Albergo. This fact alone shows the
active cooperation of the appellant in all proceedings and
her knowledge of them from the beginning.
The judgment of the court below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

MARL D. GIBSON,
Attorney for Respondent.
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